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 Abstract  
The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant 
states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law 
and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase 
rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, 
and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these.  Some researchers assert that 
governments sometimes “counteract” international human rights pressures by 
strategically substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either not targeted or are 
harder to monitor. However, most such research shows only that both outcomes correlate 
with an intervention -- the targeted positively and the spillover negatively. The burden of 
proof, however, should be as rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy 
consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves are insufficient to 
demonstrate counteraction outside of the narrow case where the intervention is assumed 
to have no direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a valid instrumental 
variable design. We revisit two prominent findings and show that the evidence for the 
counteraction claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes methodologically to the 
study of negative spillovers in general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis 
within an instrumental variables framework for assessing such arguments. It revisits 
important prior findings that claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or 
advocacy and raises critical normative questions regarding how we empirically evaluate 
hypotheses about causal mechanisms.  
 
Acknowledgments: We thank Emilie Hafner-Burton and Yonatan Lupu for sharing their 
data and commenting on earlier versions of this idea. Thanks also to Aila Matanock, 
Sarah Bermeo, Jason Klocek, Charlie Clotfelter, Geoffrey Dancy, Chris Fariss, Yuqing 
Hu, Tana Johnson, Emily Ritter, John Singleton, Michael Ward, Will Moore, Yiqing Xu, 
and Wei Song for insightful comments on earlier drafts.  
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Policymakers and scholars have long been concerned with the efficacy of 
international efforts to reform recalcitrant states. Studies have focused on the 
effectiveness of a range of tools from military interventions and sanctions to softer 
methods such as shaming and persuasion or facilitative instruments such as treaty 
commitments, education, and capacity training to achieve political reform. One area that 
has elicited close scrutiny has been efforts to improve human rights. Have norms 
ensconced in international law helped guide the development of better practices and 
protections?  Have efforts to expose human rights violations incentivized better 
government behavior?  For a long time, research concentrated on demonstrating positive 
effects; the null hypothesis was ineffectiveness. 
As human rights research has matured, scholars have started asking whether well-
intended interventions sometimes may have benefits while also causing harm.1 For 
example, has civil society advocacy simply caused flagrant rights violations to become 
stealthier? Have international legal commitments proscribing specific behaviors, such as 
political imprisonment, diverted abuses to worse outcomes like disappearance? Have 
rights commitments crowded out development objectives? Is all the attention on negative 
rights responsible for fleeting attention to social justice and equality?   In short, is the 
rights agenda virtually doomed not only to be ineffective but to cause more damage to 
humankind than it has done good?  
 
1 On the unintended consequences of human rights interventions such as international law and advocacy, see 
Conrad and DeMeritt 2014; Hafner-Burton 2008; Kennedy 2002; Lupu 2013; Posner 2008; Simmons and 
Strezhnev 2017. This focus has also been prominent in the foreign aid and sanctions literature. See Ahmed 
2012; Morrison 2009; Weiss et al. 1997; Wood 2008. See also the rule-of-law literature Carothers 2003; 
Kleinfeld 2012 and the democracy literature Kelley 2011; Simpser and Donno 2012. 
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Such questions are important for both scholars and practitioners. Given their focus 
on constrained or adaptive human behavior, these questions can inform the ongoing 
theoretical debate about the relationship between international and national actors, law 
and politics, and civil society and government agents. Such questions hold tremendous 
policy relevance. Advocates and policymakers must consider the benefits and the costs of 
their actions, as well as their distributional and moral consequences. This is not possible, 
however, if unintended consequences are not fully examined and incorporated. Scholars 
are right to ask questions about possible negative effects of policy interventions. 
As important as it is to study an intervention’s negative spillovers, it is also 
important to recognize that this study is fraught with challenges. Appropriately, tests for 
first-order consequences have confronted the plethora of typical methodological 
criticisms surrounding causal inference, but claims of second-order, unintended 
consequences often do not garner such a hard kick to the evidentiary tires. Social 
scientists should not give unintended consequences a causal pass. Good social science 
and sound policy advice demand that we test for the mechanisms suspected of negative 
effects just as thoroughly as we do the causal mechanisms associated with first-order 
positive claims and articulate clearly the evidence for the mechanism leading to net 
negative outcomes. The famous Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom caution that we cannot 
attribute compliance to states that ratify treaties because they were going to improve 
anyway is conversely apt.2 When bad states do bad things and get criticized for it, the 
same logic must apply, with a symmetrical burden of proof. Too few researchers ask 
 
2 Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996. 
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whether the bad news about repression is bad news about international law and/or human 
rights advocacy, or were these states going to misbehave anyway?  
We call attention to the evidentiary deficits in much of the research on negative 
spillovers from the promotion of human rights norms and offer a rigorous way to test 
such claims.  We first describe three distinct mechanisms through which human rights 
interventions are said to cause negative consequences: backlash, trade-offs, and 
counteraction. Claims of these consequences crop up repeatedly in the critical human 
rights literature as unintended spillovers caused by well-intended but naive human rights 
interventions, such as international legalization, enhanced monitoring, or human rights 
advocacy.  
After discussing these mechanisms, we focus specifically on counteraction and 
propose a rigorous way to detect its presence. We highlight how finding evidence of 
counteraction can be understood as a form of mediation analysis and illustrate how the 
approaches taken in the existing literature can be formulated as instrumental variables 
(IV) designs. In attempting to identify the effect of a variable targeted by an intervention 
on an unintended spillover quantity, the intervention is essentially assumed to act as an 
instrument, affecting the spillover only through its effect on the targeted outcome. Such a 
relationship is often implausible and so our proposed method provides a sensitivity 
analysis to relax this implicit assumption.3 The goal is to decompose the observed effect 
of the intervention (for example, a treaty commitment, an advocacy effort) into indirect 
 
3 Within the literature on international organizations, sensitivity analyses are a rare but increasingly valuable 
tool for evaluating the robustness of research designs. Most applications focus on assessing sensitivity of 
effect estimates in observational designs to unobserved confounding—for example, see Chaudoin, Hays, and 
Hicks 2018 which uses a variety of placebo tests on theoretically unrelated outcomes to illustrate likely biases 
in designs estimating the effect of treaty adoption. 
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and direct components (the former flow through the change in the intended target 
quantity, while direct components are unintended by the intervener, and might include a 
range of reactions or trade-offs). This sensitivity analysis holds fixed the direct effect at a 
range of feasible values and provides estimates of the implied indirect effects. We apply 
this approach to two prior studies that warn of counteraction to illustrate what this 
method can reveal when the evidence for counteraction is weak to non-existent. Although 
our substantive focus here is on human rights, our approach applies to other issue areas as 
well.  The broader purpose is to strengthen causal inference about specific mechanisms 
through which spillovers might occur. 
 
Human Rights and Unintended Consequences 
International efforts to promote human rights have been said to “produce” harm in 
several ways. The research can be distilled to three mechanisms: backlash, trade-offs, and 
counteraction (Table 1). 
 
 TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
Backlash is often said to be a consequence of external norms and rights advocacy. 
Backlash refers to a strong, negative, public, and often angry societal reaction to political 
or social change. It is a social reaction rather than an individual response or a calculated 
policy decision,4 and it may worsen other rights, or lead to entrenchment or regress on 
 
4 Which is why it often is featured in analyses of advocacy for contested social issues such as freedom of 
religion (Rafi and Chowdhury 2000) and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation 
(Epprecht 2012). 
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the targeted right.5 For example, in some societies, external pressure to promote women’s 
rights could lead to a doubling-down on more conservative social demands by opponents 
of such rights, and eventually even alter policies. In contrast to trade-offs and 
counteraction (discussed later), backlash tends to be public and defiant. Backlash can be 
and often is instigated at the top by power holders who are in some way threatened by the 
assertion of a rights claim and thus are motivated to stir up opposition to particular 
human rights practices or to foreign influence in general.6 It can be a direct response to 
criticism (for example, nationalist sentiments in response to foreign shaming)7 or it can 
be indirect (e.g., operate through a rights improvement which in turn provokes social or 
political opposition). While backlash can describe any form of opposition -- some 
scholars describe “liberal” backlash against rights violations for example8 -- we 
understand it as reasonably broad-based countermobilization against international human 
rights law, advocacy, or practice, whether or not rights improvements are realized on the 
ground.9   
Theorists of social movements see backlash as a common though hardly an 
inevitable occurrence in response to challenges to existing power structures or norms.10 
 
5 Some scholars use the word backlash to include considered public policy choices (see, for example, Helfer 
2017; Sikkink 2013) but here we distinguish social reactions from policy choices meant to reverse or blunt a 
human rights constraint (counteraction, discussed later). Sometimes these concepts merge and overlap, for 
example, when a well-entrenched official structure is deeply and widely embedded in society, like the 
“backlash” of the communist party prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Thomas 2001, chapter 6) or 
religious officials in religious societies. Rafi and Chowdhury 2000.   
6 Vinjamuri 2017, 120//---//22. 
7 Snyder 2019. 
8 Vinjamuri 2017, 116, 118. There is also literature suggesting backlash to right abuses, for example, arguing 
that torture increases violent opposition and the incidence of terrorism (Daxecker 2017) or that the torture 
memos elicited backlash against the Bush administration (Sikkink 2013).  
9 This definition may involve but goes well beyond negative individual emotional responses to criticism 
documented in the psychology literature (e.g., Scheff 2000).  
10 Tsutsui, Whitlinger, and Lim 2012. Quantitative research that finds at least short-run positive consequences 
to human rights shaming efforts include Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Franklin 2008. 
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Some go further to claim a causal chain of events that runs from international human 
rights law/advocacy to domestic anti-government mobilization,11 which then triggers 
backlash, which in turn contributes to worsening repression. The exact consequences are 
not always clear, but Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri claim that backlash may be 
associated with “pernicious, longer-term effects that may lock in regressive practices,”12 
including strategically altering laws and institutions that are more likely to violate rights 
than to protect them. This is an important claim that runs in the opposite direction of 
much research claiming that law and advocacy helps rights claimants to mobilize for 
human rights, with generally positive consequences.13 Importantly, however, such claims 
need to be tested with carefully specified models; if the claim is that human rights law 
and advocacy have caused backlash, then it is critically important to show that any 
regression in rights is not simply a symptom of broader authoritarian trends.14  
Tradeoffs. A second genre of critique is that the international human rights regime 
promotes specific legal rights at the expense of other human values. The claim is 
constructed around a notional resource constraint that implies that effort dedicated to 
human rights necessarily reduces resources available for other desirable ends. There are 
several variations on the trade-offs theme. Interventions that press for human rights could 
unintentionally divert funds from development projects;15 they could increase attention to 
negative rights, while distracting attention from economic and social rights;16 they could 
 
11 This step of the argument is the focus of Murdie and Bhasin 2011 who present evidence that the nature and 
degree of anti-government mobilization is conditional on the source of what they call “shaming.” 
12 Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri 2017, 312. 
13 Simmons 2009. 
14 Ambrosio 2016. 
15 Posner 2008. 
16 Moyn 2010. 
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denigrate human needs that cannot be formulated in rights terms at all;17 they could favor 
one protected category of people at the expense of others,18 and so forth. Eric Posner, 
perhaps the bluntest proponent of this argument, asserts that “human rights obligations 
interfere with welfare-promoting activities of the government, and these welfare-
promoting activities should be given priority.” 19   
These arguments all assume that a human rights trade-off occurs when power 
holders improve their policies in the area the intervention targets, but these improvements 
worsen nontargeted values, such as economic growth, justice, or equality. The choice to 
respond to the external intervention is strategic, but the result (better rights leading to 
poorer growth, worsening equality, or shoddy social justice) is undesired and unintended 
by both the pro-rights intervenors and likely even the targeted respondent.  
Logically, for a trade-off to exist, the targeted rights and the outcome would have 
to be strict substitutes and not complements.20  That is, we would have to believe that the 
prioritized rights such as fair trials, women’s political equality, freedom of conscience, or 
a child’s right to health care do not themselves make a positive net contribution to other 
aspects of human welfare, such as economic development, tolerance, or justice. 
“Foregrounding” arguments -- the idea that advocating right M causally reduces attention 
and therefore attainment of right Y -- have a similar trade-off structure, though typically 
 
17 Kennedy 2004. 
18 Hurd 2017. 
19 Posner 2008. 
20 We are more interested in the logical structure of the trade-off argument here, but it is worth noting that 
the weight of existing research suggests it is highly implausible, primarily because most human rights and 
other welfare outcomes are complements not competitors. On the link between education and economic 
development see Fägerlind and Saha 2014; on the positive developmental impact of closing the educational 
gap for disadvantaged ethnic groups see Calver 2015; on the impact of both health and education on 
productivity and growth, see Alvi and Ahmed 2014; on the impact of adequate housing on development see 
Harris and Arku 2006.  
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they are made in cognitive rather than strict budgetary terms. Elizabeth Hurd argues, for 
example, that protecting religious freedom renders groups other than Christians, Hindus, 
and Jews “inaudible.”21 Moreover, when religious freedom is a priority, “violations of 
human dignity that fail to register as religious infringements languish beneath the 
threshold of national and international recognition as the international community 
dedicates limited resources to rescuing persecuted religionists.”22 For Posner, advocating 
human rights competes with human welfare; for Hurd, advocating religious rights 
competes with the rights of women, racial minorities, and the disabled. For these claims 
to hold, there must be a negative effect of a targeted right on a “spillover” outcome; 
otherwise, there is no reason to believe that a causal resource trade-off, whether tangible 
or cognitive, exists. So far, we have seen little systematic evidence of these claims, and 
none that would pass traditional tests for causality.23 And yet, such claims easily morph 
into causal claims and, even more dangerously, claims that rights advocates are inflicting 
real harm.24 
Finally, we define a particular type of harm that we call counteraction, our focus 
in the rest of this article. Assuming an intervention seeks to spur improvements in human 
rights, counteraction occurs when power holders respond to the intervention by 
improving their behavior for the specific rights the intervention targets but then offsett 
these improvements by increasing other types of misconduct. It is a strategic response by 
a government to circumvent international pressure to improve its conduct in a particular 
 
21 Hurd 2017, 208. 
22 Ibid., 204. It is not clear whether Hurd means cognitive or budgetary resources; for our purposes it could 
be either or both. 
23 See the discussion in Simmons and Strezhnev 2017. 
24 For example, volume editors Hopgood, Snyder and Vinjamuri summarize Hurd’s contribution as 
showing that “the very activities of human rights promoters may bring about a deterioration in the long-
term prospects for human rights observance.” Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri 2017, 18. 
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issue area. Like trade-offs that may be made under budgetary or cognitive constraints, 
counteraction spurs improvements in the targeted area M but reduces rights in the 
spillover areas Y. It differs from interventions that merely displace the same or nearly 
identical type of misconduct by simply moving it to a different time or place, thus 
rendering the intervention (merely) ineffective in changing the net effect on the targeted 
behavior.25 Instead, counteraction involves shifts between different types of misconduct 
so that the intervention may cause new types of problems or increase the severity of 
another set of problems. It is fundamentally a causal hypothesis about the effect that 
changes in one form of behavior have on another area. It inherently involves first a rights 
improvement, the consequences of which government agents seek to reverse with 
alternative forms of repression. In contrast to backlash, which is a social reaction and can 
be either the direct response to shaming alone or a response to targeted rights 
improvements that social forces then lash back against, counteraction suggests that 
protecting targeted rights causes compensatory strategic repression in another area and 
may, depending on how one weighs the costs and benefits, do more harm than good.  
One of the most in-depth discussions of counteraction is the qualitative study of 
torture by Darius Rejali who argues that high-quality human rights monitoring has led to 
innovative forms of stealth torture, even (or especially) in democracies.26 Quantitative 
studies have also sought to document counteraction.27 For example, Hafner-Burton 
 
25 For example, in a study of Ghana, Ichino, and Schundeln 2012 found that domestic monitoring merely 
shifted excess voter registration to unmonitored areas. The type of problem did not change//--//it just moved 
elsewhere. It also differs from cases, which we suspect are rare, in which an intervention causes positive 
consequences in some countries but negative consequences of the same kind elsewhere (sets of states may 
be heterogenous). Conrad and Ritter 2013. 
26 Rejali 2007. However, while such substitution has been found to occur, Rejali comes closer to claiming 
that monitoring has not been effective than claiming that is has net negative effects.  
27 In the next section we show these studies do not use methods that support causal inferences. 
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claims that international shaming improves political rights, but that it also “often” 
correlates with more political terror,28 and suggests that one possible explanation is that 
“governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they 
make in response to international pressure to stop violations.”29 Similarly, Conrad and 
McDermitt find that when the United Nations shames countries specifically for torture, 
political rights deteriorate.30 Likewise, Lupu notes that countries that ratify the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) improve political rights but 
have more victims of disappearances. He cautiously suggests that “if the cost of using 
certain types of repressive techniques increases, governments may become more likely to 
use other, less costly options.”31  
Given their appeal to governments who want to maintain power by hook or by 
crook, such claims seem plausible and perhaps even intuitive. However, there are also 
reasons that the appearance of these various spillovers may be deceptive. Despite its 
theoretical appeal, counteraction may not be the most plausible -- and certainly not the 
only -- mechanism for explaining an observed correlation between a given behavior and a 
particular international (or for that matter, domestic) intervention.32  
All three mechanisms through which scholars make claims that international 
human rights interventions have had negative consequences have the same evidentiary 
burdens as any other causal claim. Such claims go well beyond skepticism that such 
interventions are merely ineffective. That human rights interventions have not eliminated 
 
28 Hafner-Burton 2008 See also, for example, Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012. 
29 Hafner-Burton 2008. 
30 Conrad and DeMeritt 2014. 
31 Lupu 2013, 492. 
32 Moore 1998. 
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rights abuses is hardly news, and we accept that it is the burden of the so-called optimists 
to demonstrate any improvements. But if backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction are 
claimed to worsen rights, then such claims are subject to similar demands that causality 
be scrutinized, possible spuriousness be taken seriously, and selection problems be 
considered.  
 
Methodological Focus: Modelling Counteraction 
The Problem: Modelling the Hypothesized Mechanism 
Counteraction deserves attention because researchers have attempted to 
demonstrate its negative consequences. Yet the causal minefield is evident and there are 
several reasons to be skeptical about broad counteraction claims. The first issue is 
traditional selection effects. Arendt noticed well before there was much international 
shaming that dictators facing challenges to their rule often increase repression or 
torture.33 Considering the obvious selection effects should give scholars pause before 
jumping to conclusions about law and advocacy.34 Repressive governments behave badly 
in multiple areas; their patterns of rights violations tend to look more like complements 
than substitutes.35 Interventions such as shaming target countries with worsening rights 
create a classic selection effect. Thus, although Conrad and DeMeritt argue that “when a 
state is put on notice for torture, it responds by securing its own grasp on power, limiting 
empowerment rights,”36 they cannot rule out that the UN may simply shame countries 
 
33 Arendt 1970. 
34 Conrad and Ritter 2013; Vreeland 2008. 
35 Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014. 
36 Conrad and DeMeritt 2014, 22//---//23. This is a shift in the opposite direction of what  Hafner-Burton 
2008 suggested in response to more general shaming.  
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with more, and possibly worsening torture,37 rather than cause more torture.  
A further methodological problem that may lead us to question broad 
counteraction claims is that so far scholars have used separate models to test separately 
for correlation between the intervention and each outcome. For example, Lupu’s finding 
that ratification of the ICCPR correlates with improved political rights and with increased 
victims of disappearances is based on two separate models that do not connect these 
correlations to one another. Contrary to his cautiously worded conclusion,38 this cannot 
demonstrate substitution. A difference in the intervention’s effect on the targeted 
outcome and its effect on the substituted outcome implies only that there may be some 
combination of backlash, counteraction, trade-off, or simple spuriousness. Decomposing 
the underlying mechanisms requires additional assumptions.  
Why should we be skeptical? First, the intervention may affect one outcome in 
one subset of observations but affect another outcome in another subset of observations. 
Since effects are identified as averages only, we cannot immediately conclude that these 
patterns reflect substitution at the level of the individual state. Second, the assumption 
that governments have a “menu of manipulation,”39 and can easily shift to new 
techniques of repression does not hold since repressors are already likely to choose the 
most efficient means of control.40 Third, and crucial for our method here, the effects of 
the intervention alone are not the quantity of interest for assessing counteraction. 
Counteraction implies a causal pathway linking the intervention, the targeted outcome, 
and the spillover. Thus, the targeted outcome must affect the spillover. Separate models 
 
37 Conrad and DeMeritt 2014, 15. 
38 “Results provide empirical evidence that such substitution may occur.” Lupu 2013, 492. 
39 Davenport 2007; Schedler 2002. 
40 Moore 2000. 
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thus suffice if and only if we assume counteraction is the only possible causal 
mechanism. This restrictive assumption is unlikely to hold in any real-world situation. It 
also effectively assumes away what a researcher is obligated to examine: how, exactly, 
do better rights demands make things worse? Under what conditions can we expect such 
causal deterioration? Causal mechanisms must therefore be scrutinized, which is more 
difficult than to provide evidence for overall correlations.41  
A final reason to be skeptical of broad counteraction claims is that case studies 
often underscore the importance of heterogeneous contexts.  Kuperman’s findings that 
rhetorical support for human rights can backfire in civil war settings with heavily armed 
and revolutionary rebel groups is a highly conditional argument.42  So are the scope 
conditions for Risse and Sikkink’s “spiral model,” which requires a combination of 
transnational advocates, active domestic human rights organizations, and foreign 
government support to produce internalization of human rights norms.43 Switching 
between strategies in response to external norms or monitoring is likely highly 
constrained -- and certainly not similar -- for such heterogenous cases.  
 
Formalizing Counteraction Effects 
We propose a method for assessing the plausibility of counteraction when we 
observe an intervention’s contrasting effects on two outcomes.44  We apply this approach 
to evaluate counteraction claims made by two influential studies. To start, we review the 
 
41 Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010. 
42 Kuperman 2004. 
43 Risse and Sikkink 1999. 
44 When backlash is mediated through rights improvements//--//that is, when the reaction is against the shift 
in rights enjoyment and not just foreign shaming//--//the model we suggest here is appropriate as well.  
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framework for causal mediation analysis developed in Robins and Greenland and Pearl 
and introduced to political science by Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto.45 The causal 
quantities of interest are formalized using the conventional Neyman-Rubin potential 
outcomes framework.46 Assume a total of 𝑁𝑁 units, each indexed by 𝑖𝑖. Let 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 be the 
observed spillover or offsetting outcome of interest, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 be the observed outcome targeted 
by the intervention, and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 be the observed level of the intervention. For simplicity, we 
focus on the case of a binary 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and binary 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 but our approach can be extended to 
continuous variables with additional modeling assumptions. Define 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎) as the potential 
offsetting outcome that we would observe if unit 𝑖𝑖 were assigned to take on an 
intervention value of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = a. The intervention’s total effect for unit 𝑖𝑖 is the difference 
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 =  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0).  
Causal mediation methods focus on different ways to decompose the total 
treatment effect into a “direct” component and an “indirect” component attributable to 
some mediator 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖. To motivate these decompositions, we need to define additional 
counterfactual outcomes for both 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖, following standard practice in the mediation 
literature. First, we define 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎) as the targeted outcome we would observe if unit 𝑖𝑖 were 
assigned intervention 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎. Then, we define a joint potential outcome, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚), which 
denotes the potential offsetting outcome we would observe if unit 𝑖𝑖 were assigned 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 =
𝑎𝑎, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚. We further make the “composition” assumption that 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)� = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎).47 
Using this framework, we can define additional counterfactual comparisons that permit 
 
45 Imai et al. 2011; Pearl 2001; Robins and Greenland 1992. 
46 Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974. 
47 See VanderWeele and Vansteelandt 2009 for a broader discussion of the interpretation underlying this 
particular formulation.  
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the decomposition of the overall treatment effect.48 The indirect or “causal mediation 
effect” for unit 𝑖𝑖, holding fixed the intervention at some level 𝑎𝑎 is defined as 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎) = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖�𝑎𝑎,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(1)� − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(0)) 
In other words, the indirect effect is the difference in potential outcomes when a unit is 
assigned the mediator value it would have under treatment compared to when that unit is 
assigned the mediator it would have under control. 
 Conversely, the direct effect represents the change in the potential outcome for 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 
if the treatment were manipulated while the mediator is held constant at the level it would 
take under either treatment or control, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎). 
𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎) = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖�1,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)� − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖�0,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)� 
The total effect 𝜏𝜏 for individual 𝑖𝑖 can be written as the sum 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎) + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑎𝑎) for 
𝑎𝑎 = 0, 1. In practice, researchers cannot directly estimate individual treatment effects and 
instead  focus on decomposing the average treatment effect 𝜏𝜏̅  into average direct and  
indirect effects, denoted 𝜁𝜁(̅𝑎𝑎) and  𝛿𝛿̅(𝑎𝑎).  
 
 FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the connection between the causal pathways linking 𝐴𝐴, 𝑀𝑀, and 
𝑌𝑌 and the three mechanisms discussed earlier.49 Figure 1 shows three possible causal 
arrows: (1) from 𝐴𝐴 to 𝑀𝑀, (2) from 𝑀𝑀 to 𝑌𝑌, and (3) from 𝐴𝐴 to 𝑌𝑌. The combination of paths 
 
48 Imai et al. 2011 refer to the indirect effect as the “causal mediation effect.” Robins and Greenland 1992 
term this the “pure indirect effect” when 𝑎𝑎 = 0 and the “total indirect effect” when 𝑎𝑎 = 1. See VanderWeele 
2013, 2014 for alternative decompositions. 
49 Pearl 2000. For exposition, we omit the presence of observed confounders between 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑌𝑌 along with 
observed and unobserved confounders of 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌. 
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1 and 2 reflects the indirect effect of the intervention that flows through the targeted 
outcome. Path 1 reflects the effect of the intervention on altering the targeted outcome 
and path 2 the corresponding effect of that change in the targeted outcome on the 
spillover. Conversely, path 3 reflects the direct effect unmediated by 𝑀𝑀. Counteraction 
exists when (1) is positive and (2) is negative, implying an overall negative indirect effect 
of A on Y through M.  
Trade-offs and rights-mediated backlash operate through an analogous 
mechanism. Direct backlash is captured in arrow (3), which denotes an effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 
that carries through entirely through a non-𝑀𝑀 mechanism. Notably, for a fixed overall 
effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌, we can understand counteraction and direct backlash as competing 
explanations for the same phenomenon. The plausibility of counteraction as an 
explanation for A’s negative effect on Y is strengthened when the direct effect (3) is 
either 0 or in a countervailing direction (positive). This intuition, which underpins many 
of the arguments for counteraction effects, motivates our proposed sensitivity analysis for 
assessing the indirect counteraction effect.  
The path diagram approach to causal mediation in the social sciences has its roots 
in the structural modeling framework introduced by Baron and Kenny.50 This approach 
assumes a set of simultaneous equation models for the outcome and mediator: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼1 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉1′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖1 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼2 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝜉𝜉2′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼3 +  𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉3′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 
 
50 Baron and Kenny 1986. See Zhao, Lynch Jr, and Chen 2010 for a modern review.  
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where 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖1, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 are mean zero-error terms, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes a vector of pre-
treatment covariates. 
In this framework, 𝛽𝛽2 denotes the average effect of the treatment on the mediator, 
𝛾𝛾 the mediator’s effect on the outcome, and 𝛽𝛽3 the treatment’s effect on the outcome 
holding constant the mediator. Researchers have often interpreted the product 𝛽𝛽2𝛾𝛾 as the 
effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 mediated by 𝑌𝑌.51 Imai and colleagues provide a formal justification for 
this estimator in the context of the potential outcomes framework and give the necessary 
assumptions required to interpret 𝛽𝛽2𝛾𝛾 as identifying the average causal mediation effect. 
In addition to correctly specified outcome and mediator models, identifying the causal 
mediation effect using the product of coefficients requires a sequential ignorability 
assumption. This consists of two parts: first, that the intervention is ignorable or assigned 
“as-if-random” conditional on pre-treatment covariates; second, that the mediator is 
ignorable conditional on covariates and treatment. This requires ruling out the presence 
of any confounders of the mediator and outcome that might be affected by treatment. 
While identifying controlled direct effects requires weaker assumptions52 -- permitting 
the presence of observed post-treatment confounders -- it still requires researchers to 
justify two ignorability assumptions: one for the intervention and another for the targeted 
outcome. While Imai et. al. develop a sensitivity analysis framework to relax the second 
part of sequential ignorability by allowing researchers to specify the degree of 
unobserved confounding of 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌 via the correlation between 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3, we note that 
 
51 MacKinnon et al. 2002 
52 Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016. 
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it is often difficult for researchers to develop reasonable beliefs about the magnitude of 
this unobserved confounder and thereby interpret a sensitivity analysis.  
We develop an alternative strategy that does not use sequential ignorability and 
builds on the approach already taken by researchers studying counteraction -- using the 
estimated effects of the intervention on the two outcomes. While we have pointed out that 
such an approach alone does not directly assess the presence of counteraction, it does 
provide the basis for a sensitivity analysis.  
 
Connecting the “Two Effects” Strategy to Instrumental Variables 
Among papers examining counteraction or trade-offs, it is extremely common to 
see researchers arguing for substitution based on an observed positive association 
between treatment 𝐴𝐴 and targeted outcome 𝑀𝑀 and an observed negative association 
between treatment 𝐴𝐴 and offsetting outcome 𝑌𝑌. 53 Our method starts from the necessary 
assumptions made to estimate these treatment effects: namely that there are no 
unobserved pretreatment confounders of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑌𝑌. Formally, researchers 
assume 
{𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎),𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)} ⊥ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  | 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
What can those two effects tell us about the effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 𝑌𝑌? As Imai and 
colleagues illustrated, randomization of 𝐴𝐴 does not suffice to identify the direct and 
indirect effects since it does not guarantee unconfoundedness of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎)) and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎). 
Thus, randomization of A doesn’t guarantee there is no other omitted variable causing 
 
53 A notable exception is Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014 who consider estimation of the overall dependence 
structure across multiple measures of repression over time. However, the goal in our study is not to estimate 
causal relationships between measures but to obtain an overall descriptive sense of how often these measures 
positively or negatively co-vary over time and across states.  
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both the mediator and the outcome. Using an auxiliary variable to assess counteraction is 
structurally very similar to the well-studied problem of estimating effects via 
instrumental variables (IV). In this case, 𝐴𝐴 acts as an instrument for 𝑀𝑀.54 As in IV, the 
researcher’s goal is to compare correlations between the instrument and the two other 
variables to infer something about their causal relationship. Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 
formalize the IV assumptions in the potential outcomes framework and show that for the 
case of a binary 𝐴𝐴 and a binary 𝑀𝑀 when 𝐴𝐴 (1) is exogenous, (2) has a non-zero and 
monotonic effect on 𝑀𝑀, and (3) has no direct individual causal effect on 𝑌𝑌 that is 
unmediated by 𝑀𝑀 (“exclusion restriction”), the treatment effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 𝑌𝑌 is identified 
using the ratio of the effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 and the effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 -- the classic Wald ratio 
estimator.55 As the appendix shows, under these assumptions, the IV estimator identifies  
𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 direct effect on 𝑌𝑌 for the subgroup for which 𝐴𝐴 has an effect on 𝑀𝑀 (the “complier” 
group). Additionally, researchers can incorporate covariates by assuming the linear 
structural models from the previous section and estimating 𝛾𝛾 via two-stage least squares, 
even in the presence of an unobserved confounder of 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌 
What additional assumptions are needed to apply the IV framework to mediation 
analysis? We have already assumed (1) by virtue of assuming the (conditional) 
ignorability of treatment 𝐴𝐴. Likewise, (2) can be partially tested from the data and 
rejected in the absence of a strong first-stage effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀. Assumption (3) is the 
necessary third element and is particularly questionable in the counteraction setting 
 
54 This connection between IV and identification of path effects in mediation analysis has been mentioned in 
the existing literature, most notably in Sobel 2008. 
55 Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Wald 1940. Notably, this effect is a “local” average treatment effect, 
defined for the subsample of units which are compelled by the instrument to change their level of M. While 
in many applications of IV, this is not necessarily a theoretically interesting group, for the purposes of 
evaluating counteraction it is actually the precise subpopulation of interest. 
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because it would imply that the intervention’s direct effect on the offsetting outcome 
would be 0 for all units, regardless of the targeted outcome’s level. Indeed, a strict 
exclusion restriction assumption would rule out all possible mechanisms by which A 
affects Y besides counteraction, effectively assuming what researchers set out to 
examine.  
While researchers are unlikely to believe the exclusion restriction holds exactly 
with respect to the treatment 𝐴𝐴, they may nevertheless have beliefs about the size and 
direction of 𝐴𝐴′s direct effect  on 𝑌𝑌.  A sensible question to ask is: “Given varying beliefs 
about the exclusion restriction violation, do the observed effects of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 
still support a counteraction story?” We suggest that applied researchers may still find the 
IV strategy useful for assessing counteraction when combined with a formal sensitivity 
analysis for the exclusion restriction. Our proposed approach resembles existing methods 
for conducting formal sensitivity analyses for the assumption of “no omitted variables” in 
observational studies.56 These approaches assess a given causal effect’s robustness by re-
estimating the result under varying levels of assumed omitted variable bias. Findings that 
remain statistically significant for a large range of potential omitted variable biases are 
considered relatively robust to violations of the assumption. Our approach adopts the 
same linear structural equation framework as the sensitivity analysis for sequential 
ignorability proposed by Imai and colleagues, but manipulates a different sensitivity 
parameter. Instead of assessing the magnitude of omitted variable bias confounding 𝑀𝑀 
 
56 See Cinelli and Hazlett 2018; Imbens 2003; Oster 2019. For a general overview of sensitivity analysis 
techniques in observational studies, see Rosenbaum 2002. 
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and 𝑌𝑌 that would break a result, it instead examines the magnitude of the direct effect of 
𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 that would break the IV estimate of the effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 𝑌𝑌. 
The particular approach to sensitivity analysis we propose here is similar to that 
proposed by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi57 for general violations of “exogeneity” in IV.  
To briefly describe our approach, suppose that we knew the true direct effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 
for each unit. We could then subtract this effect from the observed outcome to generate a 
new outcome 𝑌𝑌∗ which the exclusion restriction holds for by definition. Applying the 
standard instrumental variables analysis to the transformed outcome would then give a 
valid estimate for the counteraction effect under the assumed violation. Repeatedly 
carrying out this process for a range of feasible direct effects provides a set of possible 
estimates for the counteraction effect. Under the linear structural equation framework, we 
can estimate the effect of the mediator using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator.58 
This commonly used approach to estimating IV effects allows researchers to 
parsimoniously incorporate covariates in addition to handling situations where 𝐴𝐴 is not 
necessarily binary. While this approach does make some additional assumptions 
regarding effect homogeneity and correct model specification, these assumptions 
approximate what researchers are already assuming to estimate the effects of policy 
interventions using linear regression.59 Existing sensitivity analyses for mediation also 
 
57 Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2012; Ertefaie et al. 2017; Huber 2014; Kraay 2012. 
58 Angrist and Imbens 1995. 
59 The assumption of constant treatment effect, for example, is not critical for interpreting the IV estimates. 
As Angrist and Imbens 1995 illustrate, the 2SLS estimator is equivalent to a weighted average of treatment 
effects across covariate strata. This is generally true of any regression-adjustment approach for estimating 
average treatment effects. See Aronow and Samii 2016. Additionally, the assumption of correct model 
specification is a prerequisite to nearly any observational study using regression adjustment. 
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rely on the linear structural equation framework for simplicity.60 We discuss the 
assumptions in greater detail in the appendix. 
The “first-stage” linear regression assumes the following model for M 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼2 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝜉𝜉2′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes a vector of pretreatment covariates, 𝜉𝜉2′  a vector of parameters, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 is 
a mean zero-error term with finite variance. The parameter 𝛽𝛽2 denotes the average effect 
of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀. Under conditional ignorability of treatment, this can be estimated consistently 
via OLS since 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖] = 0.61  We assume another model for the outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉3′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 
Note that 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  does not appear in this model, consistent with the exclusion restriction. After 
estimating the first-stage regression via OLS, the fitted values 𝑀𝑀𝚤𝚤� are plugged into a 
second regression with 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 as the outcome along with the same covariates 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 from the first 
stage. This yields a consistent estimate of the coefficient 𝛾𝛾 even when sequential 
ignorability does not hold and 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖] does not equal 0 -- that is, the outcome 
and mediator model error terms are correlated.  
As discussed, the exclusion of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  from the outcome model is an implausible 
assumption in most empirical settings. To implement our sensitivity analysis, we assume 
the following outcome model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼3 + 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉3′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 
 
60 See Imai et al. 2011 for a generalization of the mediation sensitivity analysis for sequential ignorability to 
other outcome models.  
61 One implicit IV assumption not discussed in the previous section is that the effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 is monotonic 
for all units in the sample, which the structural model here implicitly assumes by treating 𝛽𝛽2 as constant. 
Monotonicity requires that the treatment effect of the policy on the targeted outcome cannot be positive for 
some units and negative for others. 
 24 
and assume that 𝜌𝜌 is a known constant parameter. This corresponds to a model where, in 
addition to its effect on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 also has a constant direct effect on 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 equal to 𝜌𝜌. This 
allows us to define an augmented outcome 𝑌𝑌∗ for which the exclusion restriction holds by 
definition. 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − ρ𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
For a reasonable set of values of 𝜌𝜌, we propose researchers estimate the IV effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 
𝑌𝑌∗ and plot the resulting point estimates and confidence intervals against each choice of 
ρ. While we are assuming a constant 𝜌𝜌 -- and by extension a constant treatment effect -- 
this is not an absolute requirement. In principle, a researcher could allow 𝜌𝜌 to vary across 
units, though visualizing and interpreting the analysis with more than two sensitivity 
parameters becomes rather challenging. In the appendix, we go further into the 
interpretation of 𝜌𝜌 and its relation to sensitivity parameters used in other suggested 
sensitivity analyses. 
How should researchers choose what values of 𝜌𝜌 are feasible? By definition, 𝜌𝜌 
itself depends on the scale of Y. We propose two approaches to assessing what would be 
considered a “reasonable” direct effect. The first is to standardize 𝜌𝜌 and compare against 
common benchmarks. A variety of possible standardizations exist -- we consider a 
frequently used approach for standardizing effects of binary variables: Cohen’s d. This 
quantity is defined as the unstandardized effect divided by the pooled standard deviation 






Transforming 𝜌𝜌 to 𝑑𝑑 allows us to evaluate the posited direct effects on a common scale - - 
in terms of standard deviations of the outcome62 Cohen provides a set of benchmarks for 
determining what constitutes a “small,” “medium,” and “large” effect which can be 
combined with theoretical expectations regarding the direct effect of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 to determine the 
plausibility of each IV estimate.  
 As an alternative to using these generic benchmarks, which may not necessarily 
represent what is considered a “large” or “small” effect in the particular case being 
studied, we also suggest benchmarking against the estimated effects of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. This is similar 
in spirit to the strategy used by Imbens for assessing the sensitivity estimatesto 
unobserved confounding which compares the amount of confounding that is found to 
break the finding to other known effects of variables in the data. 63  The estimated effect 
of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 provides one reasonable benchmark because, in the case of human rights 
violations, researchers typically have some theoretical beliefs about what types of rights 
the policy intervention is likely to affect the most. It is often the case that a researcher 
believes that any effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 will be largest for the targeted outcome and any direct effect 
on the spillover outcomes is unlikely to be any larger. Given these beliefs, a researcher 
would constrain the range of the sensitivity parameter 𝑑𝑑 to be no larger than the 
standardized effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖.  
 
     Examples: International Treaties, Norms, and Shaming 
 
62 Cohen 1992. 
63 Imbens 2003. 
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   We apply our framework to two of the studies that make counteraction claims with 
respect to human rights: Hafner-Burton and Lupu. 64 Hafner-Burton has been well-cited 
for arguments about the negative consequences of international interventions.65 Both 
studies, in whole or in part, use country-year measures of respect for rights drawn from 
the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) data set. Hafner-Burton evaluates the effect of 
international naming and shaming by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
international organizations such as the UN, and the news media on measures of human 
rights, while Lupu estimates the effect of ICCPR ratification on the extent to which 
governments protect both civil rights (e.g., speech, association, assembly, religion) and 
physical integrity rights. In both studies, the presence of a positive correlation between an 
intervention and a country’s respect for one set of rights and a second, negative 
correlation between that intervention and respect for another set of rights is taken as 
evidence for the counteraction hypothesis. We show that in both cases, the evidence is 
insufficient to support counteraction.  
In replicating Hafner-Burton, we find no strong or statistically significant effect of 
NGO shaming on political rights and only weak evidence for an adverse effect on 
physical integrity rights. In this case, the argument for counteraction fails the first 
necessary criterion for counteraction: that the policy intervention affects the targeted 
outcome. Even if one is to accept the presence of the effect on physical integrity rights, 
the absence of any corresponding change in political rights directly contradicts the 
hypothesis that states are “trading off” rights. In the case of Lupu, we do find some 
 
64 Hafner-Burton 2008; Lupu 2013. 
65 For citations of this finding of Hafner-Burton see, for example,  Conrad and DeMeritt 2014; Conrad and 
Moore 2010; Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012. The article has been cited nearly 
600 times. 
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evidence of the primary effect on the targeted outcome -- ratification improves some 
measures of civil rights. However, illustrating the usefulness of the sensitivity analysis, in 
applying it, we find that the true, unmediated effect of ICCPR ratification on physical 
integrity rights would have to be much larger than is theoretically plausible to sustain the 
counteraction argument. 
First, we turn to Hafner-Burton’s analysis, which considers the effects that 
international naming and shaming campaigns have on governments’ respect for civil 
liberties and for personal integrity rights. The article’s strongest results are for the effect 
of naming and shaming by an NGO -- Amnesty International (AI) -- on abuses of 
physical integrity rights. We focus specifically on replicating the country-year OLS 
results presented in Table 2 with a few important modifications.  
 Hafner-Burton measures physical integrity rights violations using a composite 
index of repression obtained by adding together the CIRI scores for the four physical 
integrity measures: killing, torture, imprisonment, and disappearances. This yields a 
variable that ranges from 0 (no violations on any of the four measures) to 8 (worst scores 
on all four measures). This is then regressed using OLS on a measure of NGO advocacy 
and shaming obtained by summing the number of press releases and background reports 
that AI issued for a given country in a given year and then taking the log, rescaling the 
measure to have mean 0.66 The regression models also include indicators for whether a 
state has signed the Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR respectively, a measure 
of democracy that coarsens the conventional Polity IV scale into a binary indicator based 
on whether the score is above or below 6, the logged GDP per capita in a given country 
 
66 While not clearly stated in the original paper, country-year observations with zero AI press releases or 
reports were arbitrarily coded 0.1 to avoid problems with taking the log of 0. 
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year, the log of population, and whether the country is experiencing a civil war or an 
interstate war. All of these regressors are lagged by one year. In addition to these 
covariates, the models include lags of the outcome variable. For the physical integrity 
rights outcome, one-, two-, and three-period lags of the outcome are included as 
regressors along with time fixed-effects. Hafner-Burton then regresses a measure of 
political rights using the same model specification except with only the one-period lagged 
outcome included as a regressor. The political rights measure comes from ratings done by 
Freedom House and ranges from 0 (no violations) to 6 (extreme repression).  
 While the results presented in this regression suggest AI shaming has the effect of 
worsening repression, they do not, in the same regression, present evidence that shaming 
also has a statistically significant positive effect on political rights. Rather, the combined 
argument for counteraction appears to come from the combination of different 
regressions on different time spans, with different identification strategies, some of which 
show an effect on one form of rights and some on another. 67 Even when using similar 
selection-on-observables identification strategies, the effects presented are identified on 
two different subsamples: Freedom House scores are available as far back as 1972 for 
some states while the CIRI scores start in the early 1980s. Combining these results to 
infer counteraction is problematic not only because they do not by themselves imply the 
existence of a counteraction effect (as our sensitivity analysis technique shows), but they 
may also not even imply the existence of both effects for a common set of states. Effect 
 
67 Table 3 in Hafner-Burton 2008 uses instruments and finds the statistical significance of the terror 
relationship with shaming disappears but that shaming is associated with higher political rights. Table 4 in 
Hafner-Burton 2008 isolates effects to different regions, finding a significant association between shaming 
and higher terror and a significant association between shaming and better political rights in the Asia and 
America regions.  
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heterogeneity, both over time and across units means that at a minimum, data-driven 
arguments for substitution or trade-off need to show effects on a common population.  
 We replicated these results with a few adjustments and corrections to the original 
data set. First, we estimated the effects on both outcomes only for the period for which 
data on both political and physical integrity rights (including the required lags) were 
available: 1984 to 2001. Second, we addressed an issue in the original data in which 
numerous observations were missing data on population. This gave us a slightly larger 
time-series cross-sectional data set than the one presented in the original paper (2,173 
versus 1,828 country-years) and corrected for the possibility that these were not missing 
at random. Third, we rescaled the logged shaming measure so that it had a standard 
deviation of 1 to help aid in interpreting the regression coefficients. Finally, in addition to 
estimating the original specifications, we estimated two specifications for the physical 
integrity rights measure with fewer lagged outcome variables. Figure 1 presents the 
estimated effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the AI shaming measure for all 
four models. 
 
 FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
 We find a slight but statistically insignificant effect of NGO shaming on improved 
political rights. Additionally, if we accept Hafner-Burton’s original identification strategy 
and use three lags of the outcome in the regression, we fail to find a statistically 
significant effect of shaming on the physical integrity itself. Only when we drop all but a 
single lag do we recover the original, statistically significant finding. However, this is 
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likely driven by omitted variable bias if we believe that Amnesty International’s 
propensity to shame a given country is influenced by multi-year trends in abuses over 
time. 
Even if we accept that identification is credible given a single period lag, the 
results would be enough to show an effect on only physical integrity rights and not 
counteraction between political and physical integrity rights. This is because, as we set 
out, showing the former using the dual correlation method requires a first-stage effect on 
the targeted outcome. This is both a theoretical and practical concern -- if the policy is 
doing nothing to alter the targeted outcome then there exists no constraint in the way that 
the counteraction hypothesis suggests. Practically, credible inference on treatment effects 
via instrumental variables techniques requires a strong first-stage effect. When 
instruments are “weak,” point estimates and standard errors based on asymptotic 
approximations, as in the case of 2SLS, are biased and have particularly poor 
performance.68 This can be seen intuitively from the form of the 2SLS estimator in the 
single instrument/single endogenous variable case, which is a ratio of two OLS 
coefficients. When the denominator is close to 0 (no effect of A on M), the resulting 
2SLS estimate will be extremely large and extremely variable. We therefore omit 
presenting a sensitivity analysis of the Hafner-Burton result since the results fail to show 
even the minimum necessary conditions for counteraction to be plausible and, indeed, 
 
68 A number of thresholds based on the first-stage F-statistic for inclusion of the instrument (with a single 
instrument, just the squared t-statistic) have been proposed in the literature. See Staiger and Stock 1997; 
Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002. In the case of the Lupu replication, the first-stage F on ICCPR ratification is 
5.21, suggesting a reasonable but not particular strong first-stage estimate. In general, Angrist and Pischke 
note that in the presence of a weak instrument, IV estimates tend to be very imprecise (209). We consider 
this a feature rather than a bug of our approach because we consider strong evidence that the intervention 
actually improves behavior a necessary condition to persuasively conclude that a counteraction mechanism 
may be operating.  
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any sensitivity analysis in this case is likely to be both extremely high-variance and 
potentially misleading.  
To demonstrate counteraction through the dual-regression method, researchers 
must establish that, at minimum, the policy intervention affects the targeted outcome of 
interest. Without this first step, any counteraction is entirely speculative. Given what we 
find in replicating Hafner-Burton’s main regression, we cannot conclude that the results 
provide evidence that “governments continue or expand their use of political terror … to 
cancel out other improvements governments make but do not want to work.”69 The 
replication cannot establish any initial improvement to counteract and the results showing 
expansion of political terror are themselves questionable given what we expect regarding 
omitted variable bias.70 In sum, we find no support for the article’s claims about 
counteraction. 
Next, we turn to Lupu, who primarily focuses on assessing the extent to which the 
effect of international human rights treaties depends on domestic courts’ ability to 
credibly enforce those rights. He theorizes that civil rights violations are easier to 
prosecute compared to violations of physical integrity rights (e.g., torture) as a result of 
variation in the costs of producing evidence. Because governments’ abuses of physical 
integrity rights are much harder to document, courts will be much less able to force 
governments to abide by international legal commitments with respect to those rights. 
The theory predicts that ICCPR ratification will improve governments’ performance on 
indicators of civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech, association, etc.) while having no effect 
 
69 Hafner-Burton 2008, abstract. 
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on performance for indicators of physical integrity rights. Rights measures are taken from 
the CIRI data set and take on values from 0 to 2 with 0 denoting frequent/severe 
violations, 1 denoting occasional violations, and 2 denoting no reported violations. 
Using a series of ordinal probit regression models estimated on a country-year 
data set, Lupu finds a positive and statistically significant association between ICCPR 
ratification and three indicators of civil and political rights from the CIRI data set: 
freedom of association, freedom of speech, and religious freedom. He finds no 
statistically significant association between ICCPR ratification and three out of the four 
physical integrity variables (killings, torture, and imprisonment) but does find that 
ICCPR ratifiers have worse CIRI ratings on disappearances. The regression models 
control for measures of judicial independence, democracy (as measured by the Polity IV 
scale), regime durability, civil war, external war, logged GDP per capita, log population, 
and a measure of the number of  international NGOs the state is a member of. The models 
also control for the one-year lag of the outcome and include fixed effects for each year. 
With the surprising finding of a negative effect for disappearance, Lupu suggests 
that counteraction may be to blame. While describing the claim as “tentative” he posits 
that “because ICCPR commitment constrains governments’ ability to restrict the 
freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion, they may turn to harsher 
methods, for which evidence is less costly to hide, to accomplish what they no longer can 
with less egregious human rights violations.”71  This is clearly a claim about 
counteraction, in that the constraint placed on civil and political rights is hypothesized to 
directly influence the expanded use of disappearance. 
 
71 Lupu 2013, 492. 
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We replicate these four regressions, fitting ordinary least squares regressions of 
the CIRI score on the same linear additive models proposed in the original paper.72  We 
also make a few slight corrections to the data to obtain a larger sample size (2,155 versus 
1,966 as reported in the data). Figure 3 presents our estimated effects of ICCPR 
ratification on each CIRI score. We replicate the originally reported pattern for measures 
of association and disappearances. If we assume that conventional significance levels are 
appropriate -- an important normative question not considered here -- we do not find a 
statistically significant effect (α =  .05) on speech or religious freedom. On average, 
ICCPR ratifiers have a .06 higher score on association and a .05 lower CIRI score with 
respect to disappearances.  
 
Implementing the Sensitivity Analysis 
Our method stresses the importance of a sensitivity analysis to help interpret the 
observed effects and the plausibility of counteraction.  Given our finding, what can we 
say about the plausibility of counteraction between improvements in association rights 
and the worsening of disappearances? Figure 2 plots the sensitivity analysis for the 2SLS 
estimate of the counteraction effect for varying levels of the exclusion restriction 
violation. The light gray line denotes the naive estimate: what our estimated effect would 
 
72 We choose not to estimate ordered probit models as in the original paper. In practice, even with non-
linearities in outcome variables, OLS will provide a best linear approximation to the causal response function. 
Additionally, 2SLS requires linear models for both stages. See Angrist 2001. 
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be if we believed ICCPR ratification had no effect on disappearances aside from its effect 
on association rights. In this case, the effect is negative, consistent with counteraction, 
but imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant at any conventional rejection 
threshold (p = 0.177). Notably, although the two reduced-form estimates were 
statistically significant and in opposite directions, implied estimate of the causal effect of 
one outcome on the other is not statistically significant. This highlights one possible 
drawback of our method -- we give up some statistical power in exchange for more 
flexible assumptions. If we were to assume that there is no direct effect of ICCPR 
ratification on CIRI disappearance -- in other words, assuming that counteraction or a 
trade-off is the only possible mechanism -- then the estimated average effect of ICCPR 
ratification on CIRI disappearance would equal the indirect effect and the two-stage 
approach would be unnecessary unless the specific effect of association on disappearance 
scores was of interest. However, because we do not want to simply assert that 
counteraction is the only possible mechanism but instead assess the plausibility of an 
indirect effect for a variety of possible direct effects, we need to accept some reduction in 
power to properly conduct inference on the effect of the mediator. For reasonable sample 
sizes, we consider the reduction in power when 𝑑𝑑 is close to 0 to be far outweighed by 
the risk of falsely concluding in favor of an indirect effect when there exists a strong 
direct effect. Since the goal of sensitivity analyses is to be conservative in drawing 
inferences, we consider the increase in estimation uncertainty to be a reasonable sacrifice.  
When we vary the assumed size of the direct effect of ICCPR ratification on CIRI 
disappearance score, we conclude that there is a small range of direct effects for which 
we would obtain a statistically significant (p < .05) and negative indirect effect of an 
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increase in CIRI association scores on CIRI disappearance scores. Notably, if the direct 
effect is itself negative (the backlash argument), then the estimated indirect effect is 
either close to 0 or actually positive. This matches the intuition behind our sensitivity 
analysis -- the presence of a negative direct effect explains away a counteraction or trade-
off hypothesis. In a setting where counteraction is more plausible, we would see negative 
and statistically significant effects even when allowing for some amount of backlash. In 
the case of Lupu, this does not appear to be so.  
Instead of asking how much of a negative direct effect is enough to “break” the 
result, for the Lupu analysis, we consider how much of a positive direct effect is enough 
to suggest some counteraction. In other words, do we think that the observed effect of the 
intervention on the spillover outcome is too small compared to what we would expect, 
suggesting some counteraction. In the Lupu data, we find that to reject the null hypothesis 
of no counteraction at α =  .05, the direct effect of ICCPR ratification would have to be 
positive and equivalent to about .1 standard deviation of the outcome.  
 
 FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE  
 
 The sensitivity analysis is helpful because it helps probe the counteraction 
claim’s plausibility. Importantly, counteraction becomes plausible only when our prior 
beliefs about the true effect of ICCPR ratification are particularly strong and we need to 
explain away the “surprise” of a smaller-than-expected finding. Plotting the counteraction 
effect for varying levels of the exclusion restriction violation illustrates what the 
estimated effect would be if we believed ICCPR ratification affected disappearances only 
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through association rights. The sensitivity analysis thus allows us to consider whether the 
intervention’s observed effect on the spillover outcome is too small compared to what we 
would expect, which would suggest some counteraction. In the case of Lupu, we find that 
to reject the null hypothesis of no counteraction, the direct effect of ICCPR ratification 
would have to be positive and about .1 standard deviation of the outcome. While a 0.1 
standard deviation effect may seem somewhat small, suggesting plausibility of 
counteraction, in this context, it is more sensible to compare to a known benchmark 
effect. The vertical dark gray line in Figure 4 denotes the estimated counteraction effect if 
we assume that the direct effect of ICCPR ratification on the disappearance score was of 
the same standardized size as ICCPR ratification’s effect on the association rights score. 
Even if this were true, our analysis would fail to reject the null of no effect at α =  .05.  
We emphasize the importance of finding plausible bounding values for the direct 
effect when conducting the sensitivity analyses because it is always possible to find a 
range of direct effect parameter values that would yield both strong positive and strong 
negative indirect effect estimates. Analogous work on sensitivity analyses for the case of 
unobserved confounding has often proposed relying on relationships between observed 
quantities and the outcome of interest as “benchmarks” for determining what is a 
reasonable magnitude of unobserved confounding -- for example, arguing that a result is 
robust to an unobserved confounder that is as strong as the strongest observed predictor 
of  treatment and outcome.73 However, we caution against using any single 
benchmarking approach that is not informed by substantive knowledge. As Cinelli and 
 
73 However, see recent work by Cinelli and Hazlett 2020 (Appendix A.2) arguing that informal benchmarking 
approaches for unobserved confounding can be highly misleading because the true effects of observed 
confounders used as benchmarks may not be identifiable from the regressions omitting the unobserved 
confounder. 
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Hazlett argue, sensitivity analyses provide a basis for “principled argument” rather than 
an “automatic procedure” for assessing the underlying research design’s correctness.74 
Therefore, our recommendation to begin with the “first-stage” effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 as a 
benchmark for the direct effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 should be understood as the first step in 
assessing plausible direct effect values and not the final one. A researcher’s goal in 
selecting reasonable sensitivity parameters is to determine how large of an effect the 
intervention could have in general on any outcome and then assess how these effects 
would compare in size to the unobserved direct effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on the specific outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. 
Subject matter knowledge about the known effects of the intervention should guide 
researchers here. 
If an intervention is known to have relatively weak effects on most relevant 
outcomes and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is not uniquely different from those outcomes, then that suggests values 
of the sensitivity parameter far away from 0 are unlikely. One reasonable approach to 
quantifying this may be to benchmark the direct effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 using the largest 
known effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on any outcome. We recommend starting with the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 
precisely because its identification is a prerequisite to the exercise of assessing 
counteraction and because researchers are likely to have existing beliefs about the relative 
size of this effect compared to others. However, estimating effects on other outcomes 
may be useful as well, with the caveat that the set of controls needed to identify the effect 
of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 may not be the same set needed to identify the effect of the intervention on 
all relevant outcomes. The choice of reasonable bounding values will always involve a 
combination of quantitative knowledge about the general effects of the intervention with 
 
74 Cinelli and Hazlett 2020. 
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qualitative knowledge about how those effects compare with the unobserved direct effect 
on the outcome of interest. 
We can illustrate this combination of quantitative and qualitative knowledge using 
Lupu’s theoretical argument for counteraction. The domestic courts theory posits that 
because courts are more capable of enforcing civil rights compared to physical integrity 
rights as a result of differences in the availability of information, the effect of an 
international rights commitment will be larger for civil rights than for physical integrity 
rights. The direct effect of ICCPR ratification on personal integrity rights is therefore 
unlikely to be greater than the effect of ratification on civil rights, making the estimated 
effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 a plausible extreme bound for the sensitivity parameter. Based on this 
benchmark, the most feasible values for ratification’s direct effect will lie to the left of 
the dark gray line in Figure 4, all of which imply no statistically significant counteraction 
effect. In other words, Lupu introduced a counteraction hypothesis to explain the 
appearance of an effect where he anticipated finding a null based on a theoretical 
argument that predicted a direct effect of ICCPR ratification close to zero -- governments 
ratifying human rights treaties are unlikely to face significant litigation with respect to 
personal integrity rights compared to civil rights and therefore have fewer incentives for 
improvement. However, a formal analysis suggests that the gap between what was 
expected and what was observed does not provide much evidence for counteraction. The 
small but surprising negative effect on disappearances is not sufficiently surprising for us 




We live in a world where, despite the best efforts of well-meaning advocates, 
human rights violations continue. The determination of some leaders to maintain power 
and privilege through repression has led to widespread speculation that human rights 
advocates may actually exacerbate rather than alleviate the problem.75 Critics suggest that 
resources have been shifting to the hopeless quest of improving rights (at the expense of 
development, equality, or social justice); targeted governments and their populations are 
starting to lash back against international pressure; and clever despots have connived to 
replace open violations with stealth repression. These accounts allege that the international 
human rights project is worse than ineffective. 
Such negative consequences are just as important to understand as any other 
effect, but they should be subject to the same evidentiary standards as the rest of social 
science. We have discussed at least three types mechanisms to explain negative spillovers 
of human right interventions -- backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction -- that scholars 
have recently offered as reasons to throttle back on international human rights efforts. 
These claims may be plausible; all merit serious attention. But only a few researchers 
provide systematic evidence for such claims. Even fewer provide evidence that support 
their causal arguments.  
Unfortunately, evidence from the effects of interventions alone is insufficient to 
demonstrate the existence of a particular causal mechanism when the claimed effect is 
theorized to be indirect or mediated. As a first-order concern, inference on the overall 
effects of interventions is extremely challenging because interventions target problem-
 
75 Kennedy 2002. 
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ridden countries, generating a significant degree of potential omitted variable bias. 
However, even if we grant that researchers have credibly identified the first-order effects 
of these interventions, their leap to making conclusions about the second-order effects 
and their underlying mechanisms requires additional assumptions regarding the 
underlying causal structure that may not be credible.  
We have outlined three mechanisms by which interventions to improve human 
rights may have negative spillover effects on other outcomes. Counteraction is one such 
mechanism which we carefully define as a change in state behavior such that either the 
incidence or level of a spillover outcome increases in a way that is attributable to the 
change in the targeted outcome driven by the intervention. We connect this to the concept 
of a mediation or indirect effect in the causal inference literature and note the importance 
of showing a strong first-order effect of the intervention as a prerequisite to any 
theorizing about counteraction mechanisms. Unless the intervention has, ceteris paribus, 
some positive consequences, there is nothing to counter and there is no mediation.  
This is not to claim that governments who sign human rights treaties or 
experience harsh external criticisms do not (often, perhaps) do very bad things. But the 
counteraction theory requires a demonstration both that the external treatment caused bad 
results, and that the causal mechanism driving this effect is an improvement in the 
targeted area of rights.  In much of the literature, there is very little scrutiny given to such 
causal claims, even though such mechanisms are harder to assess empirically than “black 
box” correlations.76  
 
76 Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010. 
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If researchers are going to use quantitative data to assess mechanisms like 
counteraction, they need to model it explicitly. We have presented a method for assessing 
counteraction that requires fewer assumptions than a full causal mediation analysis and 
can be easily adapted to the regression approaches researchers often use for estimating 
the effects of interventions. In the two cases we explore, both of which suggest that 
interventions caused compensatory actions by governments, we find that either there 
exists no first-order impact of the hypothesized intervention or the intervention’s 
expected direct impact on the spillover outcome would have had to be so large and so 
positive as to be implausible given our theoretical expectations. We conclude that it is far 
more likely that deteriorating rights have more to do with garden-variety selection effects 
or possibly alternative mechanisms than they do with strategic counteraction.   
We focused primarily on counteraction because quantitative research has been 
used to back such claims. But the approach we suggest is appropriate for any theory that 
links unintended outcomes to mediated, or indirect effects. For example, claims about 
budgetary trade-offs would have to show that by making human rights a priority, some 
other indicator of human welfare, such as social justice, suffered a reduction in resources 
that in turn accounts for growing inequality. Similarly, arguments that the very task of 
improving human rights has negative downstream consequences will be more convincing 
when they demonstrate that human rights law and advocacy has first had its intended 
effect of improving rights -- that is, there is some positive rights outcome to counter. The 
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methods we propose could be used to shed light on a range of claims about unintended 
consequences found loosely stated in the literature.77 
Our general approach can also be useful, in somewhat modified form, to test for 
unintended consequences in other issue areas. For example, a government facing a budget 
constraint might choose to fund technologies that replace coal power plants, but scale 
back efforts to reduce automobile emissions (trade-offs); might oppose plans to reduce 
carbon emissions by stimulating political or social resistance (backlash) or might respond 
to pressure to reduce carbon emissions by requiring an expensive technology, but counter 
the effects of that on companies by allowing them to lower their standards in another area 
to offset those costs, essentially then merely shifting a pollution problem from one type to 
another (counteraction).  
Negative consequences to human rights advocacy warrant continued vigilance, 
and the concerns of researchers who have hypothesized trade-offs, backlash, and 
counteraction are utterly valid. But there is a danger to attributing harm to international 
human rights law and advocacy when they are not the cause. Counteraction is a 
particularly serious mechanism since its existence implies that no intervention could 
potentially improve rights across the board since improving rights in one area would 
cause denigration of human rights in other areas to compensate for the improvements. 
The risk of discouraging promotion of international human rights norms based on under-
identified causal mechanisms is very serious indeed. Statistical science aside, we would 
argue that even if committing to and advocating international human rights sometimes 
 
77 For example, a backlash argument, as we discussed could also be unmediated: backlash could focus on the 
intervention per se, even if rights never improve. 
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cause some harm, this would not necessarily justify silence. Rather, it should prompt 
consideration of means to blunt the effects of counteraction. While this is not the place to 
elaborate, we think moral grounds alone might justify continued rhetorical and 
substantive support for international human rights. These are philosophical and practical 
questions for policymakers and the international community to answer together. Our 
purpose has been to avoid unsupported inferences and point a way toward investigating 
these issues more rigorously to implement the most effective policies to improve human 
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 TABLE 1. The logic of three spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction 
 Description Condition Mechanism Outcome 
Backlash 
A policy intervention aimed at improving 
human rights (M) triggers a broad reaction 
or countermobilization that ultimately 
causes a worsening in one area of human 
rights (Y) irrespective of any realized 
improvements 











A policy intervention prioritizes one area 
of human rights (M), thereby reducing 
attention to other issue areas (Y), 
(economic development, equality, justice). 
The result is a worsening in the other issue 
area(s). 











A policy intervention improves human 
rights in one area (M). As a direct 
consequence of this improvement, changes 
in government behavior result in a 
worsening of human rights in another 
sector (Y). 
Violator(s) 






















 Notes: Point estimates denote coefficients on the standardized logged Amnesty International coverage 
variable from OLS regression with all covariates + year fixed effects. Lines denote 95 percent robust 
standard errors clustered by country. N = 2,173, Countries = 140; Coverage: 1984 --- 2001. 
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 Notes: Point estimates denote coefficients on ICCPR ratification from OLS regression with all covariates + 
year fixed effects. Lines denote 95 percent robust standard errors clustered by country. N = 2,155, 
Countries = 144; Coverage: 1982 --- 1999. 
 FIGURE 3. Replication of main effects of ICCPR ratification from Lupu 2013 
 
 
 Notes: Solid black line denotes point estimate from 2SLS. Dotted lines denote 95 percent robust 
confidence intervals clustered by country.  Light gray line denotes estimate assuming no direct effect of 
ICCPR ratification. Dark gray line denotes estimate assuming the magnitude of the direct effect was equal 
to the magnitude for the effect of ICCPR ratification on CIRI association score. First stage F-statistic on 
ICCPR ratification = 5.21 
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